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I. INTRODUCTION 
How do property owners fare before the Roberts Court?  Quite well.  
Owners prevail in 86% of civil property-related disputes with 
government entities.1  But this statistic does not tell the whole story.  
This Article demonstrates that under the leadership of Chief Justice 
Roberts the Court has expanded the constitutional and statutory 
protections afforded to owners to a greater extent than any prior Court.  It 
analyzes the key trends in the Court’s jurisprudence that will shape its 
decisions on property issues in future decades. 
Almost 100 years ago, Justice Holmes remarked that government 
regulation of property which went “too far” would be unconstitutional; 
yet the precise line between permissible and impermissible action has 
never been drawn.2  The issue has generated debate through much of 
American history, particularly in recent decades as the influence of 
conservative ideology on the Supreme Court has expanded.  The Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts were broadly viewed as more sympathetic to 
private property than the Warren Court had been.  However, the most 
controversial anti-owner decision of the modern era, Kelo v. City of New 
London,3 was decided in the final year of the Rehnquist Court.  In Kelo, 
the Court held that the city was empowered to condemn owner-occupied 
homes and transfer them to private developers as part of an economic 
redevelopment project4―a ruling that ignited a firestorm of protest 
across the nation. 
In his confirmation hearings to serve as Chief Justice, John Roberts 
pledged to act as an “umpire” on the Court, a person with “no agenda” 
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who would merely “call balls and strikes, and not . . . pitch or bat.”5  
These statements suggested that his approach to controversial issues such 
as the scope of property rights would be relatively neutral―and they also 
implied that he hoped to shift the entire Court in this direction.  But in 
fact, the Court’s decisions in property-related disputes have been far 
from evenhanded. 
The most striking feature of the Roberts Court property 
jurisprudence is its strong protection of property owners against 
government conduct―in contexts ranging from wetlands regulation to 
gun ownership to zoning.  As discussed in Part II of the Article, 
statistical analysis reveals that in civil property-related disputes between 
property owners and government entities, owners almost always win in 
the Roberts Court.  Conversely, owners usually lose in property-related 
disputes involving criminal law. 
Part III analyzes four substantive themes that help to explain how the 
Roberts Court has reshaped the Court’s historic approach to property 
law, focusing on civil cases that involve constitutional issues.6  First, the 
Court has increasingly “propertized” the Constitution by interpreting the 
Second and Fourth Amendments through a property lens and by 
enlarging the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.  Second, 
the Court’s greater dedication to safeguarding homes has contributed 
toward its pro-owner orientation.  Third, the Court’s decisions have 
apparently been influenced by heightened distrust of government 
officials to adequately respect property rights.  Finally, the Court has 
begun to redefine the scope of what constitutes “property” in a manner 
that increasingly expands the rights of owners. 
Part IV explores how the Court’s property jurisprudence will evolve 
in the wake of Justice Scalia’s death.  When the Roberts Court era began, 
Scalia’s influence on property doctrine was so powerful that it would 
have been impossible to foresee how the Court might approach the 
subject in his absence. But the four core themes developed in the first 
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decade of the Roberts Court―spurred in part by its new 
membership―will form the foundation for its property jurisprudence in 
coming years, allowing us to draw preliminary conclusions about how 
the Court will address property issues in the future. 
II. OWNER V. GOVERNMENT: WHO WINS IN THE ROBERTS COURT? 
A. Civil Cases 
In McBurney v. Young, the Roberts Court unanimously proclaimed 
that the right to “‘take, hold and dispose of property, either real or 
personal,’ has long been seen as one of the privileges of 
citizenship”―citing a case decided almost 200 years ago.7  Consistent 
with this pro-owner orientation, the Court has generally shielded owners 
against government action in civil cases, despite ongoing debate about 
the appropriate scope of property rights.8 
Discourse on protecting private property rights from government 
encroachment centers on civil cases.  Yet civil disputes between owners 
and government entities that reach the Supreme Court are relatively rare.  
Property issues surface occasionally in constitutional law, mainly in 
cases involving the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  But disputes 
arising under the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Amendments may also 
affect property rights; and federal statutes ranging from the Clean Water 
Act to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the Fair Housing Act 
may have a similar impact.  This Article accordingly takes a broad view 
of what constitutes a “property-related dispute” between an owner and a 
government entity, including disputes involving rules that go well 
beyond core property law doctrines, as discussed in the Appendix. 
In general, a “property-related dispute” as used in this Article 
connotes a lawsuit between an owner and a government entity where 
legislation, administrative decisions, or other official actions allegedly 
infringe private property rights―the contents of the metaphorical bundle 
of sticks.  The Roberts Court has now generated enough decisions in 
property-related disputes to permit a preliminary study of its overall 
approach. 
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In order to determine how property owners fared, I examined the 
twenty-nine decisions issued by the Roberts Court prior to Justice 
Scalia’s death that involved a civil property-related dispute in which an 
owner was either a petitioner or respondent and the opposing party was a 
government entity.9  The outcome of this study was a remarkable 
finding: the owner won in 86% (25/29) of these decisions.  It should be 
stressed that this result is based on both a relatively small number of 
decisions and a generous definition of what may be classified as a 
“property-related dispute.”  Accordingly, the finding is best viewed as a 
tentative indication rather than as a statistically significant conclusion.  
Yet, at a minimum, it suggests that far from serving as a neutral umpire, 
the Roberts Court generally favors owners over government entities. 
B. Criminal Cases 
Although property-rights scholarship focuses on civil cases, property 
rights are obviously at stake in a variety of lawsuits connected to 
criminal law.  Most commonly, an owner seeks to exclude evidence 
against her in a criminal trial based on an alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation or argues that a statute concerning a property-related crime 
does not apply to her situation.  An owner might sue for damages for an 
alleged wrongful search by law enforcement officers under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.10  Or an inmate 
might complain that prison officials violated his rights to acquire or 
possess property.  The outcome in property-related disputes in the 
criminal law setting is sharply different from the result in civil cases. 
During the study period, the Roberts Court decided thirty-two 
criminal property-related disputes in which the parties were a property 
owner (normally one accused or convicted of a crime) and a government 
entity.11  In contrast with the Court’s rulings in the civil context, the 
owner prevailed in only 38% (12/32) of these cases. 
Despite the general pro-owner orientation of the Roberts Court, this 
result is not surprising because these categories of cases trigger policy 
concerns quite different from those in civil cases.  The retribution and 
deterrence goals of criminal law weigh heavily against efforts to exclude 
evidence based on an allegedly unconstitutional search, especially 
because police officers must be afforded a considerable amount of 
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deference for quick decisions made in the course of criminal 
investigations.  In Bivens cases, officers are entitled to qualified 
immunity from liability unless their conduct was “plainly 
incompetent”12―a difficult standard for an owner to meet.  And in cases 
involving inmate property, courts typically accord officials wide 
discretion given the challenges of prison operation. 
But statistics―standing alone―provide only limited assistance in 
understanding the Roberts Court’s orientation toward property issues in 
criminal proceedings.  Although the Court substantially enlarged the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection afforded to property owners,13 
this development is masked by the overall decision count. 
III. CORE THEMES IN ROBERTS COURT PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE 
A. From Umpire to Guardian 
The Roberts Court has emerged as a staunch guardian of property 
rights, despite John Roberts’ statement during his confirmation hearings 
that he would view his role as an umpire.  It is hardly shocking that a 
Court influenced by conservative Justices would tend to protect private 
property.  Nor should an observer be startled if the decision of a Justice 
in a specific case might appear to differ from general comments he or she 
made during confirmation hearings. 
Yet two aspects of the Roberts Court approach to property are 
somewhat surprising: (1) the extent to which it favors owners over 
government in civil property-related disputes, as discussed in Part II 
above; and (2) the specific mechanisms that the Court has utilized in its 
property jurisprudence, as discussed below. 
Four key themes dominate the Court’s property jurisprudence and 
thus help to explain its focus on protecting owners in civil property-
related disputes.  First, more than its predecessors, the Roberts Court has 
engaged in “propertizing” the Constitution: it is reinterpreting key 
constitutional provisions through a property lens in a manner than tends 
to safeguard owners.14  In a similar vein, it exhibits significantly greater 
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reverence for the home than its predecessors, increasingly shielding the 
home from government action.  A third theme seems to be distrust of 
government officials to respect property rights, which is deployed to 
justify enhanced protection for owners.  Finally, and more broadly, the 
Court is shifting the boundaries of what constitutes “property” in a 
manner that tends to favor owners. 
B. “Propertizing” the Constitution 
1. Constitutional Property 
Scholars have viewed the Constitution as creating two distinct forms 
of protection for private property, one general and one specific.  The Due 
Process Clause15 and the Takings Clause16 of the Fifth Amendment 
protect “property” in general against certain actions of the federal 
government, and the Fourteenth Amendment extends the scope of these 
clauses to encompass actions by state and local governments.17  
“Property,” as used in this context, is defined by a source outside of the 
Constitution itself, most commonly state law.  In contrast, the Third and 
Fourth Amendments extend constitutional protection to specific objects 
of property rights.  The Third Amendment protects the “house,”18 while 
the Fourth Amendment applies to “houses, papers, and effects.”19  Thus, 
the Third and Fourth Amendments may each be viewed as creating a sort 
of “super-property right” whose interpretation is governed by federal 
law.  Due to their constitutional genesis, these super-property rights 
necessarily trump inconsistent state law. 
The dominant theme in the property jurisprudence of the Roberts 
Court is what might be the “propertization” of the Constitution, that is, 
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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expanding property themes in constitutional doctrine.  This transition is 
reflected in the Court’s revolutionary decisions reinterpreting the 
protection accorded to specific forms of property in the Second and 
Fourth Amendments, and in its major opinions enlarging the scope of the 
Takings Clause to protect property in general. 
The Roberts Court has reshaped Second Amendment jurisprudence 
to the point where the amendment comes close to creating a new specific 
constitutional property right―the right to possess a handgun.  It has 
transformed the standard used to determine whether a search has 
occurred under the Fourth Amendment by adopting a property-based 
approach, overturning almost fifty years of case law.  Finally, it has 
broadened the reach of the Takings Clause, thus enhancing the ability of 
property owners to seek compensation for government action.20 
To a degree, this trend continues an approach established during the 
Burger and Rehnquist Court eras.  But the Roberts Court has proven to 
be more aggressive in propertizing the Constitution than past courts have 
been―despite its repeated endorsement of the maxim that the Court 
should be particularly reluctant to overturn prior decisions concerning 
property rights.21 
The key Roberts Court opinions in the propertization process tend to 
share three characteristics.  First, they were written by Justices associated 
with the conservative wing of the Court―Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia and Alito.  Second, these decisions generally seek to 
establish bright-line rules, as opposed to case-by-case standards.  Finally, 
they often reflect an originalist orientation, grounded in historical 
analysis of property doctrines as they existed when the Bill of Rights was 
ratified. 
2. Second Amendment 
The Second Amendment attracted little judicial attention for most of 
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our nation’s history.  For decades, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
amendment as only protecting a collective right to “keep and bear” 
weapons for the limited purpose of military service, not an individual 
right to keep and bear weapons as a general matter.  Thus, in the 1939 
decision of United States v. Miller,22 the Court stressed that the 
amendment was adopted “[w]ith obvious purpose to assure the 
continuation and render possible the effectiveness” of militia forces.23  
Consistent with this interpretation, the Court had never struck down any 
law regulating weapons as unconstitutional. 
The Roberts Court revolutionized this field in its 2008 decision in 
District of Columbia v. Heller,24 holding for the first time that the Second 
Amendment guarantees “the individual right to possess and carry 
weapons” without any necessary connection to militia service.25  Heller, 
who wished to keep a handgun in his home for personal defense, 
challenged a District of Columbia statute which effectively prohibited 
the possession of such weapons.26  Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, Justice Scalia wrote the majority 
opinion from an originalist perspective.27  He developed a 
comprehensive textual and historical analysis to justify the conclusion 
that the amendment recognized an individual right.  In his view, there 
was “no doubt . . . that the Second Amendment conferred an individual 
right to keep and bear arms.”28 
Scalia conceded that the right was not unlimited; it “was not a right 
to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and 
for whatever purpose,”29 just as the First Amendment did not allow 
citizens to speak for any purpose.30  He suggested that certain existing 
prohibitions on the possession of weapons by the mentally ill or 
regulations on the commercial sale of weapons might well be 
constitutional.31  But he reasoned that the District of Columbia ban was 
unconstitutional because it prohibited possession of a handgun in “the 
                                                          
 22.   307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
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 28.   Id. at 595. 
 29.   Id. at 626. 
 30.   Id. at 595. 
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home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most 
acute.”32 
Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that 
the Second Amendment was incorporated into the concept of due process 
in the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus applied to the states.33  Justice 
Alito’s majority opinion characterized Heller as protecting “the right to 
keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.”34  Largely relying 
on the historical analysis in Heller, it found the right to be “deeply 
rooted” in the nation’s history35 and “among those fundamental rights 
necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”36  Accordingly, the majority 
seemed to hold that the Second Amendment was a “liberty” within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.37  
While this approach would be consistent with the rationale used in past 
incorporation decisions, the classification was not expressly used in 
McDonald. 
Should the individual right recognized in Heller and McDonald be 
characterized as a property right?  As Justice Stevens observed in his 
McDonald dissent, “in some respects the substantive right at issue [to 
keep and bear arms] may be better viewed as a property right,”38 rather 
than as a “liberty.”  He noted that “[i]nterests in the possession of 
chattels have traditionally been viewed as property interests subject to 
definition and regulation by the States.”39  In turn, Justice Scalia retorted: 
“Never mind that the right to bear arms sounds mighty like a liberty; and 
never mind that the ‘liberty clause’ is really a Due Process Clause which 
explicitly protects ‘property.’”40  Here, Scalia seemed to straddle the 
                                                          
 32.   Id. at 628. 
 33.   561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).  For an overview of McDonald, see Symposium, supra note 24. 
 34.   McDonald, 561 U.S. at 749–50. 
 35.   Id. at 768 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
 36.   Id. at 778. 
 37.   The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: “[N]or shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 38.   McDonald, 561 U.S. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 39.   Id. 
 40.   Id. at 799 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Scalia cited his concurring opinion in United States 
v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994), to support this argument.  There he lamented that the Court’s 
majority recognized only “liberty” interests as fundamental rights under substantive due process 
analysis, even though the Due Process Clause encompasses both “liberty” and “property.”  Id. at 41–
42 (Scalia, J., concurring).  An example is Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), 
where the Court invalidated a city housing ordinance that restricted which family members could 
live in a home.  In Moore, the Court viewed the ordinance as interfering with a liberty interest 
(“freedom of personal choice in matters of . . . family life”) rather than a property right (the right to 
use a home as the owner wishes).  Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632, 639–40 (1974)). 
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fence, arguing first that the protected interest is a “liberty” under the 
clause, but then suggesting it alternatively could be covered under the 
“property” strand. 
In a functional sense, the individual right to keep and bear arms can 
be described as a property right, as Stevens suggested.  Over seventy 
years ago, the Supreme Court endorsed the conventional view that 
property rights in a physical object are the rights to “possess, use and 
dispose of it.”41  Four years after McDonald, the Court applied the 
bundle-of-rights analysis to a firearm in Henderson v. United States.42  
There, a federal law made it illegal for Henderson, a convicted felon, to 
“possess” a firearm, but the government interpreted the law as also 
barring Henderson from transferring his firearms to a friend.43  Justice 
Kagan’s unanimous opinion found for Henderson, explaining that the 
statute interfered with only “a single incident of ownership―one of the 
proverbial sticks in the bundle of property rights―by preventing the 
felon from knowingly possessing his . . . guns.”44  It reasoned that the 
government had “conflate[d] the right to possess a gun with another 
incident of ownership, which [the statute] does not affect: the right 
merely to sell or otherwise dispose of that item.”45  Viewed from this 
bundle-of-sticks framework, the right to “possess and carry” weapons 
recognized in Heller seems indistinguishable from the traditional rights 
to “possess and use” any tangible object. 
The categorization of the right to possess and carry weapons as either 
a liberty right or a property right has consequences.  As Justice Stevens 
noted, property rights in chattels have traditionally been defined and 
regulated by state law.46  If the Second Amendment right recognized in 
Heller is viewed in property terms, then states may have greater freedom 
to regulate the right.  Conversely, if the right is conceptualized as a 
liberty interest, this might narrow its scope in certain situations.  One 
question, for example, is whether Heller protects the right to own 
particular weapons (a property right) or merely a general right to own 
weapons (a liberty right).47 
                                                          
 41.   United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). 
 42.   135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015). 
 43.   Id. at 1783. 
 44.   Id. at 1784. 
 45.   Id. at 1785. 
 46.   McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 894 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 47.   See John L. Schwab & Thomas G. Sprankling, Houston, We Have A Problem: Does the 
Second Amendment Create a Property Right to a Specific Firearm?, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
158 (2012). 
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Ultimately, it may be appropriate to view the Second Amendment as 
creating a sort of super-property right that enjoys greater immunity from 
state regulation than property rights arising under state law because of its 
constitutional genesis―like the specialized property rights arising under 
the Third and Fourth Amendments.  At a minimum, however, the 
Roberts Court has revolutionized this area by creating a property-like 
right that is akin to the specific property rights protected by the 
Constitution. 
3. Fourth Amendment 
Traditionally, the definition of a “search” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment was tied to common law trespass.  Under this 
property-based approach, if the entry of government officials onto real 
property for the purpose of obtaining information constituted a trespass, 
it was deemed to be a Fourth Amendment search.48  The historic test, 
then, focused on places, not people.49  Almost fifty years ago, the Court 
appeared to reject this approach in the 1967 decision of Katz v. United 
States, holding instead that a search occurred when government efforts to 
obtain information violated a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.50  Katz essentially reversed the historic test by focusing on 
people, not places. 
For almost five decades, it was generally understood that the Katz 
doctrine had replaced the historic test.  But as part of its propertization 
campaign, the Roberts Court has resurrected the property approach by 
holding that the Fourth Amendment carves out certain constitutionally 
protected areas; entry into these areas is deemed to be a search, 
regardless of whether the owner or occupant has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.51 
The groundbreaking decision was United States v. Jones,52 where 
police attached a small global positioning tracking system to a car 
“owned” by Jones,53 who was under suspicion for narcotics trafficking.54  
                                                          
 48.   See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51–52, 57, 59 (1967). 
 49.   See id. 
 50.   See 389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967). 
 51.   For detailed analysis of decisions in this area, see Carol A. Chase, Cops, Canines, and 
Curtilage: What Jardines Teaches and What It Leaves Unanswered, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1289 (2015); 
see also Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States v. 
Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 52.   132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 53.   The car was registered in the name of Jones’ wife, but was exclusively driven by Jones; 
the Court noted that “[i]f Jones was not the owner he had at least the property rights of a bailee.”  Id. 
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The trial court denied Jones’ motion to suppress the evidence obtained 
through the GPS device on the basis that it was the product of a 
warrantless search, and he was convicted.55  Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor ruled that this conduct 
constituted a search―and therefore violated the Fourth 
Amendment―based on an originalist approach.56  Writing for the 
majority, Scalia relied almost exclusively on real property authorities, 
even though a car is classified as a chattel.57  He stressed that “[t]he 
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information,” which “would have been considered a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”58  
With little analysis, he then asserted that the Katz test had been “added 
to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”59  Under this 
approach, a Fourth Amendment search occurs where “the Government 
obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally 
protected area.”60  “What we apply,” Scalia concluded, “is an 18th-
century guarantee against unreasonable searches, which we believe must 
provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was 
adopted.”61  Concurring in the result, Justice Alito criticized the revival 
of the property test, noting the irony of using “18th-century tort law” to 
deal with a “21st-century surveillance technique.”62 
One year later, the Court revisited the scope of Jones in Florida v. 
Jardines.63  The case arose when police officers took a drug-sniffing dog 
to the front porch of Jardines’ home; based on the dog’s indication that 
drugs were present, the police obtained a search warrant and found 
marijuana plants inside.64  The trial court accepted Jardines’ argument 
that the use of the dog constituted a Fourth Amendment search, but the 
                                                          
at 949 n.2. 
 54.   Id. at 948. 
 55.   Id. at 948–49. 
 56.   Id. at 949–54. 
 57.   See id. at 948–54. 
 58.   Id. at 949. 
 59.   Id. at 952. 
 60.   Id. at 950 n.3. 
 61.   Id. at 953.  In her concurrence, Sotomayor emphasized that “the trespassory test applied in 
the majority’s opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the Government 
physically invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs.”  Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring). 
 62.   Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 63.   133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 64.   Id. at 1414. 
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state appellate court rejected the claim.65  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
finding that the police conduct did constitute a search.66 
Writing for the majority―which included Justices Thomas, 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan―Justice Scalia began by 
characterizing Jones as holding that a Fourth Amendment search occurs 
when the government obtains information by physically intruding 
“on . . . houses, papers, or effects,”67 thus somewhat clarifying the 
meaning of “constitutionally protected area.”  Under this principle, the 
case was “a straightforward one,”68 because the front porch of a home 
was part of the curtilage―“the area ‘immediately surrounding and 
associated with the home.’”69  Scalia pointed out that the curtilage has 
long been regarded as part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes, 
citing authorities which included Blackstone’s famous 1769 treatise, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.70  He distinguished the curtilage 
from a privately-owned open field because “such fields are not 
enumerated in the Amendment’s text.”71  The dissenters, led by Justice 
Alito, did not challenge the use of the Jones property test as a general 
matter, but instead argued that because members of the public had an 
implied license to approach the front door of a home, no trespass had 
occurred.72 
In sum, the Roberts Court transformed Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence in Jones and Jardines by resurrecting the property-based 
approach.  Notably, all eight current Justices have endorsed this 
approach.73  These decisions significantly enlarge the Fourth Amendment 
protection for property owners: the entry of officials into a 
“constitutionally protected area” for the purpose of obtaining information 
is a Fourth Amendment “search” even if the owner had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area.  In his Jardines opinion, Scalia 
commented that “[o]ne virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights 
                                                          
 65.   Id. at 1413. 
 66.   Id. at 1417–18. 
 67.   Id. at 1414 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950, n.3). 
 68.   Id. 
 69.   Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). 
 70.   Id. at 1414–15 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223, *225). 
 71.   Id. at 1414 (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)). 
 72.   See id. at 1420–24 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 73.   Six current Justices approved this test in Jones or Jardines; and eight current Justices later 
joined the unanimous opinion in Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (per curiam), 
which extended the test by holding that a satellite-based monitoring device attached to a person’s 
body was a “search,” despite the lack of any expectation of privacy. 
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baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”74  But does it? 
The Jones-Jardines duo suggests that the Amendment now 
encompasses a broad range of areas that are open to public view 
including: (a) the fenced or unfenced front yard, side yard, and backyard 
of a detached single-family home; (b) the airspace over a home; (c) 
outbuildings near a home, such as a garage, shed, or barn; and (d) the 
exterior and interior of airplanes, boats, cars, and trucks.  Moreover, re-
adoption of the property approach raises difficult questions about how it 
applies to forms of group housing other than the paradigmatic detached 
single-family house, such as a shared hallway or common recreational 
facilities in a townhouse or condominium development.  In short, these 
decisions seem to open the door to a plethora of future cases which will 
test the outer limits of the property approach.75 
4. Fifth Amendment 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been a major 
property rights battlefield for decades.  The multi-factor test for 
determining a regulatory taking, as adopted by the Burger Court in the 
landmark 1978 decision of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York,76 was criticized by some as failing to adequately protect 
private property against government action.  An initial effort to limit the 
Penn Central approach came four years later when the Court held in 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.77 that a “permanent 
physical occupation” of an owner’s property by government or 
authorized by government is a taking, regardless of the government 
purpose it serves.78 
The Rehnquist Court continued to erode the Penn Central standard 
in later terms, particularly by adopting two new bright-line or 
“categorical” tests that broadened the regulatory takings doctrine.  In 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,79 the Court held that a 
regulation which denies an owner “all economically beneficial or 
                                                          
 74.   Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417. 
 75.   See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (holding that a city 
ordinance which required hotel operators to make their registries available to police officers without 
a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 76.   438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 77.   458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 78.   Id. at 441. 
 79.   505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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productive use of land”80 is a compensable taking unless it is justified by 
“background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance.”81  
And in the twin decisions of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission82 
and Dolan v. City of Tigard83 the Court established a second categorical 
test: the government’s exaction of a right in real property in return for a 
discretionary land use approval is a taking if (a) there is no “essential 
nexus” between the exaction and a legitimate state interest84 or (b) the 
exaction is not roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed 
project.85 
The first Takings Clause case to reach the Roberts Court, Wilkie v. 
Robbins,86 was decided in 2007.87  The case is noteworthy because the 
Court refused to create a new categorical test, in contrast to its later 
decisions which expand the scope of the Takings Clause.  Robbins, a 
Wyoming rancher, asserted that Bureau of Land Management officials 
had engaged in a “campaign of harassment and intimidation” against him 
in order to obtain an easement across his land, asserting damage claims 
under both Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics88 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act.89  The district court refused to dismiss these claims, and the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed.90  Before the Supreme Court the key issue was whether 
a Bivens claim should be recognized, though Robbins’ brief framed the 
issue more broadly: “[C]an government officials avoid the Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition against taking property without just 
compensation by using their regulatory powers to harass, punish, and 
coerce a private citizen into giving the Government his property without 
payment?”91 
Taking a pragmatic view―notably absent in later Roberts Court 
                                                          
 80.   Id. at 1015 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)). 
 81.   Id. at 1029. 
 82.   483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 83.   512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 84.   Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 85.   Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 86.   551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
 87.   See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs 
Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23. 
 88.   403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 89.   Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 541, 547–49.  The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012). 
 90.   Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 548–49. 
 91.   Id. at 556 n.8 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 21, Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) 
(No. 06–219)). 
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property decisions―Justice Souter’s majority opinion sidestepped the 
takings issue and refused to extend the Bivens approach.92  Joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and 
Alito, Souter reasoned that Robbins had adequate avenues to pursue his 
claims and, moreover, that it would be difficult to define a workable 
cause of action.93  He stressed that government in its capacity as a 
landowner was entitled “to drive a hard bargain”94 with its neighbors, 
making it impossible to determine when it “demanded too much and 
went too far.”95  Interestingly, it was Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, 
representing the more liberal wing of the Court, who argued for an 
expansive reading of the Fifth Amendment: “The Fifth Amendment . . . 
must be read to forbid government action calculated to acquire private 
property coercively and cost free, and measures taken in retaliation for 
the owner’s resistance to uncompensated taking.”96 
But three subsequent Roberts Court decisions97 have significantly 
broadened the scope of the Takings Clause: Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection,98 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,99 
and Horne v. Department of Agriculture.100  Taken together, these 
decisions further weaken the Penn Central approach in favor of 
sweeping categorical rules which make it more likely that government 
action will be deemed a taking. 
The 2010 decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment is important 
because it signals that a majority of the current Court agrees that a 
judicial decision which eliminates or substantially changes even a minor 
property right would violate the Constitution―a substantial expansion of 
                                                          
 92.   Id. at 567–68.  Part of the explanation for the outcome in Wilkie was the continued 
antipathy of Justices Scalia and Thomas toward creating any new cause of action based on Bivens, as 
reflected in Thomas’ concurrence, which Scalia joined.  Id. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 93.   Id. at 555–62 (majority opinion). 
 94.   Id. at 558. 
 95.   Id. at 557. 
 96.   Id. at 584 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 97.   The only other Takings Clause decision by the Roberts Court, Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012), broke little new ground.  In an opinion written 
by Justice Ginsburg, all eight participating Justices rejected the assertion that temporary 
government-induced flooding was automatically exempt from Takings Clause liability.  Id. at 522.  
This was an unsurprising result given the Court’s prior decisions. 
 98.   560 U.S. 702 (2010).  For an overview of Stop the Beach Renourishment, see Laura S. 
Underkuffler, Judicial Takings: A Medley of Misconceptions, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 203 (2011). 
 99.   133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 100.   135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
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the legal shelter provided to owners.101  Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Thomas and Alito would reach this result through the Takings 
Clause,102 while Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor would do so through 
the Due Process Clause.103 
Stop the Beach Renourishment was decided against the backdrop of 
three key precedents.  In its landmark Penn Central decision, the Court 
held that in determining whether government action has effected a taking 
of real property a court should consider the “extent of the interference 
with rights in the parcel as a whole,” rather than simply the portion of the 
property directly affected by the particular action.104  But a year later, in 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the Court found a compensable taking 
when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ruled that the owner’s property 
was subject to the federal navigational servitude.105  The majority 
opinion explained that there were a “number of expectancies embodied 
in the concept of ‘property’―expectancies that, if sufficiently important, 
the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes over the 
management of the landowner’s property.”106  Because of the traditional 
importance of the right to exclude, “one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property,” the Court 
concluded that a taking had occurred even though the owner retained all 
of the other sticks in the metaphorical bundle.107  The same theme that a 
taking could be found when a single important property right was taken 
resurfaced eight years later in Hodel v. Irving, where a federal regulation 
prevented Native Americans from devising extremely small fractional 
interests in Indian trust lands, as part of an effort to combat excessive 
fragmentation of property rights.108  The Court again stressed the 
importance of the right, observing that “the right to pass on property―to 
one’s family in particular―has been part of the Anglo-American legal 
system since feudal times.”109 
In contrast to these decisions, Stop the Beach Renourishment 
involved two minor property rights.110  The petitioners, owners of ocean-
                                                          
 101.   See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. 702 (2010). 
 102.   See id. at 715. 
 103.   See id. at 737 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 104.   Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978). 
 105.   444 U.S. 164, 170–80 (1979). 
 106.   Id. at 179. 
 107.   Id. at 176. 
 108.   481 U.S. 704, 706–10 (1987). 
 109.   Id. at 716. 
 110.   Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 711 (2010) 
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front property, asserted that a decision of the Florida Supreme Court 
which rejected their lawsuit against the state’s beach restoration project 
had eliminated―and thus illegally “taken”―two common law rights that 
were akin to easements: “the right to receive accretions to their property” 
from the ocean and “the right to have the contact of their property with 
the water remain intact.”111  All eight participating Justices ruled for the 
state, on the basis that the petitioners had never held such rights and, 
therefore, were not injured by the Florida decision.112 
But Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito 
reached well beyond this point to assert the novel claim that the Takings 
Clause encompassed the taking of property by judicial action, in addition 
to executive and legislative action.113  Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion 
first asserted that the Court’s precedents recognized an additional 
categorical test―that “States effect a taking if they recharacterize as 
public property what was previously private property.”114  He then 
explained that this test should apply to judicial action because (a) there 
was “no textual justification” in the Takings Clause for holding that the 
existence of such a taking should vary “according to the branch of 
government effecting the expropriation”115 and (b) “[i]t would be absurd 
to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids 
it to do by legislative fiat.”116  The logical implication of this view, of 
course, is that federal courts have the ultimate power to determine state 
property law, not state courts.117  Although the other four Justices refused 
to embrace the judicial takings theory, Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor 
argued that substantive due process could provide similar protection for 
                                                          
(citing Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006), quashed sub nom. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 
(Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. 702). 
 111.   Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 711–12. 
 112.   See id. at 733; id. at 742 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 113.   See id. at 713–15 (plurality opinion). 
 114.   Id. at 713.  The plurality opinion observed that this test was part of the “general principles 
of our takings jurisprudence.”  Id. 
 115.   Id. at 714.  This textual analysis has limited value, however, since most scholars agree that 
the Takings Clause was originally intended only to apply to physical takings, not regulatory takings.  
See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (“[E]arly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause 
embraced regulations of property at all.”). 
 116.   Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 714. 
 117.   In fact, the Supreme Court sometimes opines on general principles of property law without 
citing state-specific authorities.  See, e.g., Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 134 S. 
Ct. 1257, 1265–66 (2014) (discussing law relating to easements and reversionary interests). 
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property owners.118  Without citing direct authority, they reasoned that a 
judicial decision which “eliminates or substantially changes established 
property rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the owner, is 
‘arbitrary or irrational’ under the Due Process Clause.”119 
Similarly, the plurality opinion seemed to assume that the loss of 
even one minor property right would require compensation under the 
Takings Clause.  Rather than explaining why the two easement-like 
rights at issue were important enough to satisfy the Kaiser Aetna and 
Hodel standards, it merely asserted that the “deprivation of an 
established property right” would be a taking, even if an owner retained 
virtually all other property rights.120  Even assuming arguendo that the 
Florida Supreme Court decision did eliminate two easement-like rights, 
the owners still held fee simple absolute title to their respective parcels, 
with all of the core property rights traditionally associated with the 
metaphorical bundle of sticks, including the rights to possess, use, 
exclude, and transfer.  Thus, the extent of the interference with the 
owners’ rights was minor and would not rise to the level of a taking 
under either Kaiser Aetna or Hodel. 
Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, who concurred in the result 
without joining the plurality rationale, appeared to agree that even the 
loss of a minor property right would violate the Constitution, though not 
the Takings Clause.121  Their concurrence noted that the elimination or 
substantial change of “an established property right” could “be set aside 
as a deprivation of property” under the Due Process Clause―without any 
discussion of the importance of the right.122 
In sum, five current Justices endorse the view that a judicial decision 
which eliminates or substantially changes even a minor property right 
would violate the Constitution under some circumstances.  At best, this 
rule is too vague to be meaningful.  There is no clear definition of what 
constitutes a “property right,” much less any understanding about what 
constitutes a “substantial” change in such a right.  Although there is 
widespread agreement about the content of what may be called major 
property rights―such as the classic rights to possess, use, exclude, and 
                                                          
 118.   Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 735–38 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 119.   Id. at 737 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)).  But see 
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (observing that a judicial 
decision which “constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant 
precedents” would be a taking of property without due process of law). 
 120.   Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 726 n.9. 
 121.   Id. at 735 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 122.   Id. 
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transfer―there is a host of relatively minor entitlements accompanying 
an estate which might or might not be classified as distinct “property 
rights,” depending on how finely entitlements are sliced.  For example, 
some states have altered the adversity element of adverse possession by 
judicial decisions which replace the good faith test with the objective 
test.123  If an owner’s entitlement to defeat an adverse possession claim 
by relying on the stricter good faith test is viewed as a type of “property 
right,” then such a decision might be viewed as a “substantial change” to 
this right―which would entitle him to compensation from the state if he 
loses title to an adverse claimant under the objective test. 
Three years later, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District expanded the Nollan-Dolan rule by holding that it also applied to 
fees, not simply to real property exactions.124  Both Nollan and Dolan 
involved the narrow situation where a government entity demands one or 
more easements over an owner’s real property in exchange for a 
discretionary land use approval.125  Neither decision considered whether 
the same rule would apply to fees imposed on new developments―such 
as payments to offset the impact of a new residential subdivision on a 
municipal library, park, or school―which are widely used by local 
governments to offset the cost of new infrastructure.  By extending the 
Nollan-Dolan restrictions to fees, Koontz curbs the traditional discretion 
that local governments have enjoyed in land use planning and thereby 
enlarges the constitutional protection afforded to owners.126  Before 
Koontz it was widely believed that the Takings Clause did not apply to 
fees or other general monetary obligations. 
In Koontz, a local district denied approval for Koontz’s plan to fill 
his wetland parcel in preparation for a building project because he 
                                                          
 123.   See, e.g., Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 546 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1988).  Under the 
good faith test, the adverse claimant must actually believe that she owns the land, while under the 
objective test the claimant’s state of mind is irrelevant.  See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING 
PROPERTY LAW 458 (3d ed. 2012). 
 124.   133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598–602 (2013).  For an overview of Koontz, see Lee Anne Fennell & 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 287. 
 125.   See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374 (1994). 
 126.   Another aspect of Koontz merits mention: the majority’s endorsement of externality 
theory.  Advocates of the law and economics movement have long argued that land use regulation 
should be structured to achieve economic efficiency by requiring developers to internalize their 
negative externalities.  In Koontz, a majority of the Court expressly endorsed this view for the first 
time: “Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark 
of responsible land-use policy . . . .”  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.  In a broad sense, such 
internalization is the practical effect of the Nollan-Dolan approach.  The intriguing issue is whether 
this view might affect other regulatory takings doctrines, such as the Lucas test. 
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refused to agree to either of the two concessions the district suggested.127  
One of the alternatives required that he pay for improvements to district-
owned wetlands several miles from the project site.128  Lower state courts 
reasoned that this violated the Nollan-Dolan test due to the lack of both 
an essential nexus and rough proportionality.129  But the Florida Supreme 
Court reversed.130  It reasoned that the test did not apply to (a) a demand 
for money or (b) denial of a permit for the applicant’s failure to make a 
requested concession to the district.131  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice Alito’s majority opinion 
which overturned the Florida decision on both bases.132 
The backdrop for Koontz was the Court’s 1998 decision in Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel, which involved a federal statute that required the 
former employers of retired miners to pay retroactively for their health 
care benefits.133  Four members of the Court held that the statute was a 
regulatory taking.134  While concurring with the result, Justice Kennedy 
disagreed with the plurality’s rationale on the basis that the Takings 
Clause did not apply to a purely monetary obligation.135  He stressed that 
a “constant limitation” in past regulatory takings had been that “a 
specific property right or interest has been at stake.”136  In contrast, he 
observed, the statute at issue did not affect an “identified property 
interest,” but merely required the performance of an act―a monetary 
payment that might come from any source.137 
The Koontz majority attempted to distinguish Eastern Enterprises on 
the theory that the monetary obligation at issue “burdened petitioner’s 
ownership of a specific parcel of land,” and thus somewhat resembled a 
lien.138  It asserted that the “fulcrum this case turns on is the direct link 
between the government’s demand and a specific parcel of real 
                                                          
 127.   Id. at 2591–93. 
 128.   Id. at 2593. 
 129.   Id. 
 130.   Id. 
 131.   Id. at 2593–94.  The Florida Supreme Court also distinguished Koontz from Nollan and 
Dolan on the basis that the district did not approve Koontz’s request on condition that he make the 
payment, but rather denied his application because he refused to do so.  Id. 
 132.   Id. at 2603. 
 133.   524 U.S. 498, 504–15 (1998). 
 134.   Id. at 503, 538. 
 135.   Id. at 540–42 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 136.   Id. at 541. 
 137.   Id. at 540. 
 138.   Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013). 
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property.”139  This distinction is unconvincing.  A lien burdens a 
particular property in the sense that the property can ultimately be sold to 
satisfy the debt secured by the lien, which certainly was not the case in 
Koontz.  Moreover, any “link” between the district’s demand and 
Koontz’s land is irrelevant.  The point is that the district asked Koontz to 
pay a specific amount, which he could have obtained from any source―a 
bank account, lottery winnings, or a loan from a friend.  Thus, the case 
did not involve a taking of an “identified property interest.”140 
After Koontz, it is clear that the Nollan-Dolan test applies to 
monetary exactions in the land use context―despite the obvious 
difficulty of distinguishing between an unconstitutional exaction and a 
legitimate tax.  But the outer limits of the Koontz approach are unclear.  
The majority observed that Koontz “does not ask us to hold that the 
government can commit a regulatory taking by directing someone to 
spend money.”141  But because the majority’s attempt to distinguish 
Eastern Enterprises is unconvincing, Koontz may well serve as a 
stepping stone toward a future decision which applies a Takings Clause 
analysis outside of the land use setting, potentially to any monetary 
demand made by government.142 
Finally, the 2015 decision in Horne v. Department of Agriculture143 
safeguards property rights by broadening the categorical test established 
in Loretto.144  Horne arose out of a program established by the 
Department of Agriculture to assist raisin growers by stabilizing the 
national price for raisins.145  It required each grower to physically set 
aside a certain portion of the crop, which the government could then sell, 
donate, or otherwise dispose of as appropriate to promote the raisin 
market; the government took title to these raisins.146  Each grower, 
                                                          
 139.   Id. at 2600. 
 140.   Id. at 2599 (quoting Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  
Nonetheless, the Koontz majority noted that “this case does not implicate the question whether 
monetary exactions must be tied to a particular parcel of land in order to constitute a taking.”  Id.  at 
2600 n.2. 
 141.   Id. at 2600. 
 142.   The second prong of Koontz was less controversial.  As Justice Alito summarized, “[t]he 
principles that undergird our decisions in Nollan and Dolan do not change depending on whether the 
government approves a permit on the condition that the applicant turn over property or denies a 
permit because the applicant refuses to do so.”  Id. at 2595. 
 143.   135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
 144.   See id. at 2427–28; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).  
Horne also breaks new ground in defining the extent of constitutional protection for personal 
property.  See infra discussion Section III.E.3. 
 145.   Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424–25. 
 146.   Id. at 2424. 
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however, was entitled to receive its proportionate share of net proceeds 
from such government sales.147  The Hornes refused to set aside any 
portion of their crop, and instead sued on a takings theory, arguing that 
these facts constituted a permanent physical occupation under Loretto.148  
The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim, inter alia, viewing the government 
action as a use restriction, not a physical appropriation, because the 
Hornes were not completely divested of their property rights.149 
Writing for a majority of eight Justices, Chief Justice Roberts 
concluded that the government action was a “clear physical taking” 
because the growers lost “the entire ‘bundle’ of property rights in the 
appropriated raisins―‘the rights to possess, use and dispose of’ them.”150  
Ironically, all parties agreed that the government could constitutionally 
prohibit the sale of raisins altogether without incurring takings 
liability.151  Yet even though “[a] physical taking of raisins and a 
regulatory limit on production may have the same economic impact on a 
grower,” the majority explained that the Court’s takings jurisprudence 
distinguished sharply between an appropriation and a mere regulation.152 
Despite the majority’s assertion that it was merely applying Loretto 
to a “clear physical taking,” Horne enlarges the Loretto test.153  The 
Loretto approach was designed to deal with the extraordinary situation 
where the government eliminates all of an owner’s property rights 
through a permanent physical occupation.154  In this narrow situation, the 
Loretto Court concluded, the policy reasons for the government action 
                                                          
 147.   Id. 
 148.   Id. at 2424–25. 
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S. Ct. at 2427 (emphasis added).  A future Court might view this phrase as an opening that permits 
additional factors to be used in the Penn Central analysis. 
 154.   See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435–36. 
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were irrelevant.155  It stressed that such an occupation of real property 
“effectively destroys” an owner’s traditional rights to possess, use, and 
dispose of property.156  In particular, the Court observed that such an 
occupation would “ordinarily empty the right [to dispose of property] of 
any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the 
property.”157  This rationale does not apply to the facts in Horne.  
Because the raisins were produced for commercial sale, only the right to 
dispose of them was relevant―and it was not destroyed, because the 
growers retained the right to share in proceeds from government sales.158  
After Horne, even a government “occupation” which leaves an owner 
with substantial property rights would seem to be a per se taking, 
regardless of the underlying policy basis.159 
Taken together, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Koontz, and Horne 
enlarge the meaning of the term “taken” as used in the Takings Clause, 
extending its scope to include new situations and making it more likely 
that government action will be deemed a compensable taking.  In this 
area, the Roberts Court is following the lead of the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts by broadening the categorical tests for assessing takings liability, 
thereby expanding the rights of property owners.  Based on the first 
decade of its Takings Clause jurisprudence, there is every reason to 
believe that the Roberts Court will continue this expansion in future 
decisions. 
C. Home Protection 
The home is the embodiment of the American dream, a symbol of 
autonomy, family, privacy, and security.  Thus, the law traditionally 
affords stronger protection to the home than to other forms of property.  
For example, the “house” is shielded against undue government 
intrusions by the text of the Third and Fourth Amendments;160 and past 
                                                          
 155.   See id. at 434–36. 
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Courts have often interpreted other constitutional amendments more 
broadly when the conduct in question occurs in a home.161 
Yet the level of respect that the Supreme Court accords to the home 
varies over time.  In the controversial decision of Kelo v. City of New 
London, for example, a majority of the Rehnquist Court concluded that 
homes were not entitled to more protection from eminent domain than 
other types of property.162  This sparked a stinging dissent from Justice 
O’Connor, who complained, inter alia, that “[n]othing is to prevent the 
State from replacing . . . any home with a shopping mall.”163 
The Roberts Court evidences unusually strong reverence for the 
home in both rhetoric and substance.  Justice Souter expressed this 
sentiment in an early Roberts Court decision when he observed that 
“[w]e have . . . lived our whole national history with an understanding of 
‘the ancient adage that a man’s house is his castle [to the point that t]he 
poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the 
Crown.’”164  Exalting the home as the most favored type of property, the 
Roberts Court has interpreted constitutional provisions and federal 
statutes in a manner that singles out houses for enhanced protection.  
This is particularly true in its key decisions interpreting the scope of the 
Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.165  All eight current 
Justices have joined in decisions containing broad language that extols 
the importance of the home. 
The Court’s landmark 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, interpreting the Second Amendment to create a personal right to 
bear arms, cannot be separated from the factual context in which it arose: 
                                                          
 161.   See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment 
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the plaintiff’s desire to keep a handgun in his home for self-defense.166  
The first line in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion focused on this point: 
“We consider whether a District of Columbia prohibition on the 
possession of usable handguns in the home violates the Second 
Amendment to the Constitution.”167  In striking down the statute, the 
majority emphasized that the prohibition “extends, moreover, to the 
home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most 
acute.”168 
Two years later, the Court ruled in McDonald v. City of Chicago that 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the “Second Amendment right 
recognized in Heller” against the states in another case where owners 
sought to keep handguns in their homes.169  Notably, Justice Alito’s 
majority opinion characterized Heller as holding that “the Second 
Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the 
purpose of self-defense,”170 rather than a broader right that would extend 
outside of the home.  The possession of handguns for home defense, 
then, was the central justification for abandoning the traditional view that 
the Second Amendment only applied to the operation of militias.171 
The Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the Roberts Court reflects a 
similar shift toward shielding the home.  The Court applied the Katz 
privacy-based test in the 2006 decision of Georgia v. Randolph, where 
the issue was whether police could conduct a warrantless search of a 
home where one co-occupant consented to the search, but another co-
occupant objected.172  Yet in doing so it began the process of circling 
back to the traditional property-based test which provided greater 
protection for homes and the surrounding curtilage.  Justice Souter’s 
majority opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer, and 
Ginsburg, stressed that the determination of reasonableness in Fourth 
Amendment consent cases was closely tied to “widely shared social 
expectations,” which were “naturally enough influenced by the law of 
property, but not controlled by its rules.”173  Stressing the “centuries-old 
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principle of respect for the privacy of the home,”174 the Court found “no 
recognized authority in law or social practice”175 which allowed one co-
occupant of a home to “open the door to a third party”176 over the 
objection of another co-occupant and, accordingly, held that the search 
was illegal.177 
The Court’s return to the property-based approach in United States v. 
Jones178 and Florida v. Jardines179 restricts warrantless home searches, 
thus enlarging the rights of home owners and occupants.  The six current 
Justices who joined one or both opinions―Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan―thereby 
endorsed the broad pro-home language that they contain.180  Although 
the property at issue in Jones was a vehicle, the Court’s justification for 
returning to the property-based approach was largely based on real 
property law.181  It cited an eighteenth-century English decision for the 
proposition that “[o]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, 
that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave; 
if he does he is a trespasser.”182  Thus, an improper search would occur if 
officials intruded on a “constitutionally protected area,”183 such as the 
“curtilage of a home.”184 
Jardines, in turn, extended the property-based Jones approach to a 
home, where police brought a drug-sniffing dog to an owner’s porch in 
an effort to search for marijuana.185  Although the government argued 
that the owner had no reasonable expectation of privacy on his front 
porch and thus that the entry was legal under Katz, the Court held that 
the police conduct violated the Fourth Amendment because it took place 
“in a constitutionally protected area.”186  The majority opinion explained 
that “when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among 
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equals,” because the heart of the Amendment is a person’s right to 
“retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.”187  And the curtilage, the area immediately 
surrounding the home which included the porch, is similarly protected.188 
The same orientation is evident in Jones v. Flowers, which was 
decided under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.189  
The broad issue was whether due process required a government entity to 
take additional steps to provide notice to a property owner when its 
mailed notices of a tax sale were returned as undeliverable.190  Writing 
for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized the fact that the property 
involved was a home: “In this case, we evaluate the adequacy of notice 
prior to the State extinguishing a property owner’s interest in a home.”191  
When viewed within this framework, the Court concluded that the notice 
was insufficient.192  It doubted that “a person who actually desired to 
inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a house he 
owns would do nothing” when a mailed notice was returned 
unclaimed.193  And it reasoned that a sender of a returned letter would 
normally try to resend it, especially “when, as here, the subject matter of 
the letter concerns such an important and irreversible prospect as the loss 
of a house.”194 
Finally, this focus on safeguarding the home helps to explain the 
Court’s recent interpretation of the federal Fair Housing Act195 in Texas 
Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc.196  Enacted in 1968, the Act prohibits, inter alia, 
discrimination based on race, color, and other factors in connection with 
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the sale or rental of a home.197  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
explained that the Act was adopted against a backdrop of de facto 
residential segregation in many areas of the nation: “Racially restrictive 
covenants prevented the conveyance of property to minorities; steering 
by real-estate agents led potential buyers to consider homes in racially 
homogeneous areas; and discriminatory lending practices . . . precluded 
minority families from purchasing homes in affluent areas.”198 
The issue was whether a defendant could be held liable under the Act 
on a disparate-impact theory, without proof that it actually intended to 
discriminate.199  In other words, could a plaintiff prevail based only on a 
showing that the defendant’s practice had a disproportionate impact on 
minority groups and was not justified by any legitimate rationale?200  In 
holding that disparate-impact claims were cognizable, the Court focused 
on the Act’s “results-oriented language” and stressed that this outcome 
was consistent with its statutory purpose: to eradicate housing 
discrimination.201  The majority opinion closed by acknowledging the 
Act’s “continuing role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated 
society.”202  By enabling more effective enforcement of the Fair Housing 
Act, Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs helps to assure 
that all citizens have an equal right to the home of their choice. 
Indeed, the only decision where the Roberts Court ruled against a 
homeowner was Stop the Beach Renourishment.203  This outcome is 
explained by the fact that all eight participating Justices concluded that 
the underlying Florida Supreme Court decision under attack was correct 
under state law, which rendered the constitutional issues moot.204  It is 
also important to note that the case did not concern homes per se, but 
rather the location of the seaward lot line of oceanfront homes.205 
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D. Government Distrust 
The third distinctive theme evident in Roberts Court property 
jurisprudence is heightened distrust of government―a sense that officials 
cannot be relied upon to act in good faith in matters involving property 
rights.  Under this mindset, federal courts must craft their decisions to 
safeguard owners against the serious risk that other branches of 
government will engage in unreasonable or even abusive conduct.  As 
used in decisions involving state and local governments, this theme 
sometimes results in minimizing concerns of federalism in favor of 
justifying more robust federal action.206  Of course, it is often difficult to 
determine whether anti-government statements in Supreme Court 
decisions affect the outcome or are merely rhetorical flourishes.  But 
both the frequency and the stridency of these assertions increased during 
the first decade of the Roberts Court.  And at least in some majority and 
plurality opinions, the distrust of government theme is woven into the 
reasoning that supports the outcome.207  All eight current Justices have 
either written or joined in majority opinions that reflect such distrust. 
Property decisions rendered during the Burger and Rehnquist eras 
generally did not display such distrust, except in occasional dissents.  
Indeed, decisions from this era reflect a certain degree of deference to 
government entities.  In the 1978 decision in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, for example, the Court crafted 
the modern three-part test for determining if a regulatory taking had 
occurred without expressing fear of governmental misconduct.208  One of 
the factors―whether the interference “arises from some public program 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good”―assumed that officials would act in good faith.209  
Although the Court subsequently eroded the Penn Central approach in 
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Loretto,210 Lucas,211 Nollan,212 and Dolan,213 it did so without overtly 
basing their rationales on fear of governmental oppression.214  Moreover, 
in the 2002 decision of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency,215 the Court rejected the petitioners’ 
argument that it should adopt a per se rule for temporary takings in part 
because this approach would find a taking “regardless of the good faith 
of the planners” who adopted a moratorium, again assuming that officials 
would act in good faith.216  Even in Kelo v. City of New London, decided 
in the final year of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure, the plurality opinion 
deferred to the defendant city’s decision to condemn the plaintiffs’ 
properties, without questioning the wisdom of the decision or the good 
faith of city officials.217 
The shift toward a more skeptical approach began in Jones v. 
Flowers,218 one of the first Roberts Court decisions involving property 
rights.  Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion, joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, concluded that Arkansas violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to 
provide a homeowner with adequate notice of a tax sale.219  The central 
theme in the opinion is that the state was unconcerned about the 
adequacy of its notice: “We do not think that a person who actually 
desired to inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a 
house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter sent to the owner 
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is returned unclaimed.”220  And in the closing paragraph of the opinion, 
Roberts complained: 
There is no reason to suppose that the State will ever be less than fully 
zealous in its efforts to secure the tax revenue it needs.  The same 
cannot be said for the State’s efforts to ensure that its citizens receive 
proper notice before the State takes action against them.221 
The implication here is that officials are predominantly concerned with 
enriching the state rather than protecting the rights of its citizens. 
One year later, in Rapanos v. United States, the plurality opinion 
written by Justice Scalia struck a similar note, this time directed against 
regulations issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.222  The issue in 
the case was the appropriate interpretation of the phrase “waters of the 
United States” under the provisions of the Clean Water Act which 
regulate the filling of wetlands.223  Scalia complained about an “immense 
expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the 
Clean Water Act―without any change in the governing statute―during 
the past five Presidential administrations.”224  The Army Corps of 
Engineers, he asserted, “exercises the discretion of an enlightened 
despot” in deciding whether to issue a permit to fill wetlands.225  
Concurring in the decision, Chief Justice Roberts lamented that rather 
than narrowing its authority over wetlands in response to prior Supreme 
Court decisions, “the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless 
view of the scope of its power.”226 
Yet later that same year, in Wilkie v. Robbins,227 the Court resisted 
temptation to rule against the federal government where its agents 
allegedly engaged in a campaign of “harassment and intimidation” to 
force a landowner to convey an easement over his land to the Bureau of 
                                                          
 220.   Id. at 229. 
 221.   Id. at 239. 
 222.   547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 223.   Id. at 729. 
 224.   Id. at 722. 
 225.   Id. at 721.  Scalia also rejected the argument that Congress had acquiesced in the 
challenged regulations, noting that the Court could not determine whether the failure of Congress to 
act was attributable to its members’ belief that the regulations were appropriate, their assumption 
that the courts would correct any problems, “or indeed simply to their unwillingness to confront the 
environmental lobby.”  Id. at 750. 
 226.   Id. at 758 (Roberts, J., concurring); see also T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. 
Ct. 808, 815 (2015) (disregarding the city’s argument that the Court’s interpretation of federal statute 
would “deprive it of local zoning authority”). 
 227.   551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
2016 PROPERTY AND THE ROBERTS COURT 33 
Land Management, by declining to recognize a new Bivens action.228  
Indeed, Justice Souter’s majority decision opined that even if “[t]he 
action claimed to be retaliatory may gratify malice in the heart of the 
official who takes it . . . the official act remains an instance of hard 
bargaining intended to induce the plaintiff to come to legitimate 
terms.”229  Dissenting, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens protested that 
“[t]he constitutional guarantee of just compensation would be worthless 
if federal agents were permitted to harass and punish landowners who 
refuse to give up property without it.”230 
The Court returned to the distrust theme in its 2010 plurality opinion 
in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection, this time focused on state court judges.231  As 
noted above, Justice Scalia’s opinion asserted the novel claim that the 
Takings Clause encompassed the taking of property by judicial 
decisions.232  “It would be absurd,” he asserted, “to allow a State to do by 
judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative 
fiat.”233  In order to determine whether a state judicial decision has 
“taken” a property right, he reasoned that federal courts must necessarily 
be the final arbiter of what property rights exist under state law: “A 
constitutional provision that forbids the uncompensated taking of 
property is quite simply insusceptible of enforcement by federal courts 
unless they have the power to decide what property rights exist under 
state law.”234  Inherent in this view is the notion that state court judges 
cannot be trusted to determine state law.  As Scalia commented: “[O]ur 
opinion does not trust judges with the relatively small power Justice 
Kennedy now objects to.  It is we who propose setting aside judicial 
decisions that take private property . . . .”235 
A similar, if muted, theme can be seen in the 2012 decision of 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, where Justice 
Ginsburg’s unanimous opinion identified the factors to be considered in 
determining whether a temporary physical invasion of private property 
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by government should be deemed a compensable taking.236  The list 
included a factor concerning the intentionality of government conduct: 
“the degree to which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result 
of authorized government action.”237  This factor―which implies 
potential bad faith by government officials―had not previously surfaced 
in the Court’s modern takings jurisprudence. 
Justice Alito struck the same anti-government cord in Sackett v. EPA 
in 2012.238  He concurred in the majority opinion that property owners 
were entitled to challenge administrative compliance orders issued under 
the Clean Water Act, beginning his opinion with this sentence: “The 
position taken in this case by the Federal Government―a position that 
the Court now squarely rejects―would have put the property rights of 
ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) employees.”239  He continued: “[T]he combination of the 
uncertain reach of the Clean Water Act and the draconian penalties 
imposed for the sort of violations alleged in this case still leaves most 
property owners with little practical alternative but to dance to the EPA’s 
tune.”240  The clear implication of these remarks is that EPA officials 
cannot be trusted. 
In the 2013 decision of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District, where the Court extended the Nollan-Dolan rule, Justice Alito 
centered his majority opinion on fear of government misconduct.241  He 
began by characterizing Nollan and Dolan as providing protection 
against “the misuse of the power of land-use regulation.”242  Land use 
applicants, he reasoned, were especially vulnerable to “coercion” and 
“[e]xtortionate demands” by local officials.243  “Extortionate demands for 
property in the land-use permitting context,” he explained, “run afoul of 
the Takings Clause . . . because they impermissibly burden the right not 
to have property taken without just compensation.”244  Turning to the 
monetary exactions issue, Alito asserted that the Nollan-Dolan test had 
to be expanded to encompass demands for fees because otherwise “it 
would be very easy for land-use permitting officials to evade the 
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limitations” of these decisions.245  The common themes running through 
these justifications is that local officials are likely to both (a) make 
extortionate demands on land developers and (b) seek to evade Supreme 
Court rulings. 
An echo of the government mistrust theme can also be seen in the 
2015 decision of Horne v. Department of Agriculture, where eight 
Justices agreed that the Takings Clause applied equally to real property 
and personal property.246  As discussed above, the case involved a federal 
program intended to aid growers by stabilizing the price for raisins by 
keeping part of the crop off the market―a program that most growers 
supported.247  Yet Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion summarized 
the Court’s holding in this manner: “The Government has a categorical 
duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it 
takes your home.”248  The direct address to the reader (“your”) and 
substitution of a personally-owned item (“car”) for tons of raisins 
destined for commercial sale makes the holding more memorable.  Yet it 
virtually warns the reader against a supposed danger that the government 
might try to seize his property without any payment.249 
Admittedly, it can be difficult to distinguish rhetoric from reasoning 
in Supreme Court opinions.  But, at a minimum, the rationales in certain 
Roberts Court decisions in property-related cases appear to be partially 
premised on judicial fear of misconduct by other branches of 
government, ranging from federal officials to local legislatures to state 
courts.  Taken to its logical extreme, the implication of this view is that 
only federal courts may be relied upon to safeguard property rights.  
Perhaps Justice Scalia reflected this mindset in his Stop the Beach 
Renourishment plurality opinion when he proclaimed: “Where the power 
of this Court is concerned, one must never say never.”250 
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E. “Property” Boundaries 
1. Expanding Boundaries 
The central question in American property law is simply stated: 
What is “property”?  The word is notoriously difficult to define.  Indeed, 
one scholar claims that “[t]he question is unanswerable.”251 
The Roberts Court continues to use the traditional metaphor that 
“property” may be viewed as a “bundle of rights,” following in the 
footsteps of prior Courts.  Two decisions from the 2014 term illustrate 
the point.  In Henderson v. United States,252 the Court unanimously held 
that a federal statute that made it unlawful for a convicted felon to 
“possess” a firearm did not eliminate the other “proverbial sticks in the 
bundle of property rights.”253  Thus, the government was not entitled to 
prevent Henderson, a convicted felon, from exercising “the right merely 
to sell or otherwise dispose of that item.”254  A few weeks later, in Horne 
v. Department of Agriculture,255 the Court found that the federal 
government had violated the Takings Clause because a government 
program eliminated “the entire ‘bundle’ of property rights in the 
appropriated raisins―‘the rights to possess, use and dispose of’ them.”256  
But while the bundle of rights metaphor may be useful in deconstructing 
the components of “property,” it provides no real guidance about what 
“property” is in the first instance. 
The scope of laws that regulate property is inextricably intertwined 
with the meaning of “property.”  For example, the Takings Clause and 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provide different forms 
of protection for “property.”  A court might enlarge the reach of the 
Takings Clause either by broadening the meaning of the term “taken” or 
the meaning of “property.”  In like fashion, the breadth of the Due 
Process Clause is determined by the meaning of both “due process” and 
“property.”  The same duality is evident in interpreting statutes and case 
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law involving “property.” 
The Roberts Court is directly enlarging the substantive protection for 
property, as discussed earlier in this Article.  But there are also 
indications that the Court, or at least part of the Court, may be seeking to 
do the same thing indirectly―by enlarging the boundaries of what 
“property” means.257  Tentative efforts on this front can be identified in 
three areas.  First, is everything that has value “property”?  Second, 
should real property and personal property be given equal legal 
protection as “property”?  Finally, is the meaning of “property” protected 
by the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause static or dynamic? 
2. “Property” and Value 
Courts and scholars have struggled for decades to define the meaning 
of “property” as the term is used both in the Constitution and in federal 
statutes.  It has been traditionally accepted that states have the principal 
role in defining the meaning of “property” as a general matter,258 and that 
federal courts will thus largely rely on state law to define the term.  For 
example, in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, a Burger era 
decision, the Court explained that the creation and scope of property 
interests were “defined by existing rules or understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law.”259 
Yet this approach creates the risk of circularity, as Justice Kennedy 
explained in two Rehnquist Court decisions.  In his Lucas concurrence, 
Kennedy noted that if “the owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped 
by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, 
property tends to become what courts say it is.”260  Kennedy’s solution to 
the circularity dilemma was to broaden the scope of owner expectations: 
“The expectations protected by the Constitution are based on objective 
rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties 
involved . . . in light of the whole of our legal tradition.”261  He expanded 
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on this theme in his plurality opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,262 
describing property as stemming from the “common, shared 
understandings . . . derived from a State’s legal tradition.”263 
At bottom, these authorities seek to provide a process for 
determining what constitutes “property” based on the facts of a particular 
case, rather than providing a general definition.  This is far from a 
workable standard.  Indeed, Kennedy has acknowledged that the Court 
needs to develop a “neutral, stable, extrinsic” definition of property.264 
The Roberts Court addressed a key issue in this definitional struggle 
in Sekhar v. United States: is everything that may indirectly have value 
“property”?265  The case arose against a backdrop of earlier decisions 
which held that not all valuable interests constituted “property.”  For 
example, in the 1945 case of United States v. Willow River Power Co., 
the Court observed that “not all economic interests are ‘property rights’; 
only those economic advantages are ‘rights’ which have the law back of 
them.”266  And during the final year of the Rehnquist era, the Court 
observed in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales that an interest was not 
“property” under the Fourteenth Amendment if it had no “ascertainable 
monetary value.”267  But Sekhar appears to contradict the Court’s prior 
holdings.268 
Sekhar involved a vague and intangible “right” located on the fuzzy 
border between property and non-property: an employee’s right to make 
a recommendation to his superior.269  The case required the Court to 
interpret the Hobbs Act, which imposes criminal liability for extortion 
related to interstate commerce;270 the Act defines “extortion” to include 
“obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by 
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wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear.”271  The 
issue was whether using threats “to compel a person to recommend that 
his employer approve an investment” was obtaining “property” from 
another.272  The Second Circuit held that the employee, the general 
counsel of a state agency, “had a property right . . . to recommend―free 
from threats―whether the [agency] should” invest in a fund managed by 
a particular private firm.273  It accordingly upheld the defendant’s 
conviction.274 
The Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision, but with 
differing rationales that went beyond the statutory meaning of “property” 
under the Act.275  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kagan joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion.276  Scalia 
initially refused to decide whether the right to make such a 
recommendation was “‘property’ in a broad sense or not”; but he 
reasoned that even if it were, it was not property that could be transferred 
to another―and thus not “obtainable property under the Hobbs Act.”277 
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, concurred 
in the result.278  Alito noted that dicta in earlier decisions suggested that 
property covered by the Act extended to “any valuable right considered 
as a source or element of wealth,”279 and that Black’s Law Dictionary 
also endorsed this broad definition of the term.280  But, concluding that 
“the jury’s verdict stretches the concept of property beyond the breaking 
point,” Alito reasoned that the right to make such a recommendation was 
not “property” even if it might have some value.281  He noted that 
“[d]espite the breadth of some of these formulations,” the term “plainly 
does not reach everything that a person may hold dear; nor does it extend 
to everything that might in some indirect way portend the possibility of 
future economic gain.”282  Alito based his analysis on the reasonable 
expectations approach, noting that “[i]t is not customary to refer to an 
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internal recommendation to make a government decision as a form of 
property” and that “[i]t would seem strange to say that the government or 
its employees have a property interest in their internal 
recommendations.”283 
Justice Scalia responded to Alito’s analysis in a footnote, indicating 
that he was “not sure” whether the right was “property”; but he seemed 
to suggest that any valuable item might be property: “If one defines 
property to include anything of value, surely some rights to make 
recommendations would qualify―for example, a member of the Pulitzer 
Prize Committee’s right to recommend the recipient of the prize.”284  
Scalia went on to observe that “a prominent journalist would not give up 
that right (he cannot, of course, transfer it) for a significant sum of 
money―so it must be valuable.”285 
Thus, five current Justices appear to agree that a right has 
“value”―and thus constitutes “property”―if a person would not 
surrender it in return for a monetary payment, even if (a) the right is not 
transferable in the market sense and (b) it has no ascertainable monetary 
value.  But there is a plethora of “rights” in everyday life which a person 
could conceivably give up in return for an undetermined amount of 
money.  This list might include the “rights” to apply for a job, eat meat, 
enjoy art, drive a car, read a book, or look at a starry sky.  None of these 
“rights” have market value; nor are any transferable.  Yet under the 
majority approach, they are all arguably “property.”  This position would 
dramatically enlarge what the law has traditionally viewed as “property,” 
thereby expanding the protection that “owners” receive. 
3. Real Property v. Personal Property 
Another ongoing debate is whether real property is entitled to greater 
protection than personal property.  Rehnquist era opinions reflected such 
a distinction, for example, in the context of the Takings Clause.  In 
Andrus v. Allard (1979), the Court held that a law prohibiting owners 
from selling their eagle feathers was not a taking;286 but in Hodel v. 
Irving (1987) it held that a law prohibiting Native Americans from 
devising their lands was a taking.287  Justice Scalia reflected on this 
                                                          
 283.   Sekhar, 133 S. Ct. at 2728 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 284.   Id. at 2726 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 285.   Id. 
 286.   444 U.S. 51, 67–68 (1979). 
 287.   481 U.S. 704, 716–18 (1987). 
2016 PROPERTY AND THE ROBERTS COURT 41 
distinction in his majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council: 
[I]n the case of personal property, by reason of the State’s traditionally 
high degree of control over commercial dealings, [an owner] ought to 
be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his 
property economically worthless (at least if the property’s only 
economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale).  In the 
case of land, however, we think the notion pressed by the Council that 
title is somehow held subject to the “implied limitation” that the State 
may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is 
inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings 
Clause . . . .288 
The clear implication is that a regulation which eliminates all economic 
value of real property is a taking; but a regulation which has the same 
impact on personal property is not.  Thus, the jurisprudence of the 
Rehnquist Court suggested that government probably has greater leeway 
in regulating personal property than real property.  The Roberts Court 
rejects this view.  More than any of its predecessors, the Roberts Court 
has moved toward extending equal protection to both forms of 
property.289 
The Roberts Court took the first steps toward eliminating any 
distinction between real property and personal property under the 
Takings Clause.  Writing for the five-member majority in Koontz v. St. 
John’s River Water Management District,290 Justice Alito extended the 
Nollan-Dolan approach from exactions of real property to encompass 
demands for monetary payments.291  Alito justified this shift on practical 
grounds, noting that such fees are “functionally equivalent to other types 
of land use exactions,” that is, to government demands for exactions of 
real property.292  Seemingly, then, the Nollan-Dolan rule now applies 
equally to exactions of real property and money―and thus presumably to 
any other form of personal property as well.293 
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Two years later, the Court examined the issue more broadly in Horne 
v. Department of Agriculture.294  In the underlying decision, the Ninth 
Circuit refused to find a taking of the Hornes’ raisins under Loretto, in 
part based on the rationale that “the Takings Clause affords less 
protection to personal than to real property.”295  It based this conclusion 
mainly on the excerpt from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas 
quoted above.296  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts soundly 
rejected this distinction in the context of a physical taking: 
Nothing in the text or history of the Takings Clause, or our precedents, 
suggests that the rule [governing takings] is any different when it 
comes to appropriation of personal property.  The Government has a 
categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as 
when it takes your home.297 
The Court explained away the Lucas dictum on the basis that that case 
“was about regulatory takings, not direct appropriations.”298  Notably, 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan 
all joined in this part of the opinion.299  After Horne, it is clear that seven 
current Justices believe that Loretto applies equally to physical takings of 
real property and personal property. 
In the wake of Koontz and Horne, it is increasingly likely that a 
future Court will narrow the distinction between real property and 
personal property under the Takings Clause in the context of regulatory 
takings.  Under the logic followed by the Horne Court, certainly nothing 
in the text of the Clause justifies any distinction between the two.  Yet 
because commentators generally agree that the Framers did not 
contemplate that the Clause would apply to regulations that merely 
restrict the use of property,300 such textual analysis provides little 
assistance.  The central difficulty is that the Framers clearly intended 
state and federal governments to exercise broad control over intrastate 
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and interstate commerce―which would necessarily include restrictions 
on the manufacture, sale, and possession of personal property. 
Riley v. California,301 a recent Fourth Amendment decision, may 
signal that the Roberts Court is also beginning to close the gap between 
real property and personal property in other contexts.302  On its face, the 
Amendment expressly extends to searches and seizures of both certain 
real property (“houses”) and personal property (“papers, and effects”).303  
Yet the Court has often given less protection to personal property which 
is seized or searched outside of the home. 
When Riley was searched incident to a traffic stop for expired 
registration tags, officers seized his cell phone, examined its contents, 
and found incriminating photos and videos.304  This evidence was 
admitted at trial over Riley’s objection that the officers had conducted a 
warrantless search.305  Writing for the eight-member majority, Chief 
Justice Roberts reasoned that the search was improper.306  Although it 
was well-settled that officers could search an arrestee without a warrant, 
Roberts explained that a cell phone was fundamentally different from 
physical objects typically found in such a search, such as keys or 
cigarettes.307  Because a cell phone has immense data storage capacity, 
he reasoned, its search poses a significant threat to personal 
privacy―much like the search of a home: “Indeed, a cell phone search 
would typically expose to the government far more than the most 
exhaustive search of a house . . . .”308  Thus, seven current Justices 
apparently agree that computers, tablets, and other digital media 
interfaces will receive heightened protection under the Fourth 
Amendment―akin to the protection accorded to the family 
home―despite their traditional classification as personal property. 
4. Static Property v. Dynamic Property 
Is the definition of “property” as used in the Due Process Clause and 
Takings Clause static or dynamic?  The Supreme Court has addressed 
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this issue to some extent in the past.  But the debate between Justices 
Scalia and Kennedy in Stop the Beach Renourishment309 may provide 
new insight into how the Court will approach the issue in the 
future―with implications for how far the Constitution protects property 
rights. 
The foundation of the American property law system is English law 
as it existed before 1776.  As Morton Horwitz has observed, the English 
system was rooted in a “static agrarian conception” of property 
law310―and accordingly, a static view of what constituted “property.”311  
Yet a body of American property law began to arise in the nineteenth 
century as judges altered English doctrines to meet conditions in the 
United States, which were quite different from those in England.  As 
American courts retooled English property law doctrines in order to 
encourage the development of wilderness lands, mainly for agricultural 
use, the meaning of “property” evolved over time.312 
The American wilderness had largely disappeared by the dawn of the 
twentieth century, but population growth and urbanization created new 
pressures on property law.  In this setting, the Court again acknowledged 
that the permissible scope of property law―and thus the definition of 
“property” itself―must evolve in response to changing conditions.  The 
foundation of modern land use regulation is the 1926 decision in Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., where the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of comprehensive zoning against due process and equal 
protection attacks.313  It noted that the increasing urbanization and 
population growth of the era justified “additional restrictions in respect 
of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities . . . 
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[that] a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have 
been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.”314  Accordingly, it reasoned 
that the scope of the application of constitutional guarantees concerning 
property must “expand or contract to meet the new and different 
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their 
operation.  In a changing world it is impossible that it should be 
otherwise.”315 
In recent decades, the static-dynamic dispute has largely been framed 
in terms of whether a compensable taking has occurred under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Under the Takings Clause “property” may not be “taken” 
by the federal government for “public use” unless just compensation is 
provided to the owner.316  By necessity, there is a close relationship 
between the definition of “property” and the standard for determining 
when property is “taken.”  Although the Court has focused on defining 
property in terms of the reasonable expectations of the owner, it has not 
clearly decided whether such expectations might change over time. 
The static-dynamic fissure surfaced during the Rehnquist era in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,317 as evidenced by the contrast 
between Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence.  Scalia seemed to concede that the definition of property 
might change over time to some extent―without giving rise to takings 
liability―when he noted that “[i]t seems to us that the property owner 
necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to 
time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate 
exercise of its police powers.”318  But he stressed the limited scope of this 
approach: when a regulation prohibited “all economically beneficial use 
of land” it would constitute a taking unless it was justified by 
“background principles [that] . . . the State’s law of property and 
nuisance already place upon land ownership.”319  This reference to 
“background principles” implied a static set of property doctrines.  
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence took a broader approach, stressing that an 
owner’s “reasonable expectations” should be “understood in light of the 
whole of our legal tradition,” which envisioned gradual changes in 
property rights over time.320  Thus, “[t]he State should not be prevented 
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from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing 
conditions . . . . The Takings Clause does not require a static body of 
state property law.”321  Dissenting, Justice Stevens complained that the 
majority approach “effectively freezes the State’s common law, denying 
the legislature much of its traditional power to revise the law governing 
the rights and uses of property.”322 
In the Roberts Court, the static-dynamic dispute has widened from a 
fissure into a chasm.  In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice Scalia’s plurality 
opinion, which announced that if a court “declares that what was once an 
established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that 
property.”323  Under this logic, property law is forever frozen in time 
regardless of any changed circumstances that might justify modification.  
This is an avowedly originalist view of property rights, which echoes the 
approach of the Roberts Court in its Second and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence―examining the scope of the respective rights to possess 
guns and be free from home searches, as defined by eighteenth-century 
law. 
Concurring in the result and joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice 
Kennedy noted that “[s]tate courts generally operate under a common-
law tradition that allows for incremental modifications to property 
law.”324  Because “owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to 
make certain changes in property law,” he reasoned, an “incremental 
modification” by government action would not violate the 
Constitution.325  In other words, the scope of property rights may change 
over time to some extent as the expectations of property owners evolve.  
Kennedy cited the example of the traditional common law rule governing 
liability when roots from a tree located on one owner’s property damage 
an adjacent property: “If a court deems that, in light of increasing 
urbanization, the former rule for allocation of these costs should be 
changed, thus shifting the rights of the owners, it may well increase the 
value of one property and decrease the value of the other.”326  But under 
Kennedy’s approach, this would probably be consistent with the 
Constitution. 
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In turn, Scalia insisted that the definition of “property” was static.  
He asserted that Kennedy’s above analysis was “an astounding 
statement.”327  “[I]t is not true,” he asserted, that the “‘common-law 
tradition . . . allows for incremental modifications to property law,’ so 
that ‘owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to make certain 
changes in property law.’”328  This position went well beyond the 
position he and others had supported in Lucas, where he appeared to 
concede that property rights could be modified by government action, at 
least to some extent, without incurring liability for a taking.329 
The historical record overwhelmingly supports the Kennedy 
position.  American courts have routinely modified the common law 
rights of property owners for centuries in response to changing 
conditions―without any serious argument that this violated the 
Constitution.  While there are many examples, one illustration suffices to 
make the point.  Consider the easement by necessity.  Suppose that A, 
who has title to a large tract of land that adjoins a public road, conveys 
part of the land to B.  Under the traditional view, B is entitled to an 
easement by necessity over A’s retained land to reach the road only if B 
can establish strict necessity, that is, if B had no legal right of access to a 
public road when A severed title.  Under the Scalia approach, one might 
argue that A has an “established right of private property” to avoid 
imposition of an easement by necessity over his land unless strict 
necessity exists.  But over time, changing conditions have led most 
American courts to reject the strict necessity standard in favor of the 
reasonable necessity approach.  B, the party seeking the easement, need 
only show that it is beneficial or convenient to her land.  This arguably 
“eliminates” the right of landowners like A to avoid such easements.  
Scalia presumably would have argued that this is a compensable 
taking―though no landowner has ever made such a claim.  In turn, 
Kennedy would probably find no taking on the basis that the reasonable 
expectations of landowners evolve over time. 
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In short, a static definition of “property” is inconsistent with the 
American legal tradition.  Decisions of American courts routinely alter, 
restrict, or even eliminate property rights over time, consistent with the 
common law tradition, as they gradually respond to changing economic, 
social, geographical, and technological conditions.  Absent unusual 
circumstances, a property owner cannot hold a “legitimate expectation” 
that her property rights will never be impaired by government 
action―and thus Kennedy would argue that no compensation is due. 
In summary, three current Justices (Roberts, Thomas, and Alito) 
endorse the static approach to the definition of “property” as embodied in 
the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality opinion; two Justices 
(Kennedy and Sotomayor) disagree; and the remaining three Justices 
(Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) have not yet taken a position on the issue.  
Taken to its logical extreme the static approach would require either that 
(a) courts refrain from deciding cases in a manner that might modify 
property law or (b) the government compensate owners for such changes.  
Neither outcome is palatable.  The first alternative abandons our 
common law tradition.  And the second invokes Justice Holmes’ warning 
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that “[g]overnment hardly could go 
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished 
without paying for every such change in the general law.”330 
IV. THE PATH AHEAD: PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE IN THE POST-SCALIA 
ERA 
Justice Scalia was an outspoken champion of property rights who 
profoundly influenced the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts during his thirty-year tenure.  But his passing is unlikely to signal 
a major change in the Court’s approach to property issues.  The most 
profound effect of his absence will be to slow the pace at which the 
Court’s property jurisprudence expands. 
One prediction is relatively easy: the Roberts Court will not reverse 
any of its core decisions interpreting the scope of protection for 
constitutional property under the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  The Court traditionally applies stare decisis with more 
stringency in cases involving property rights than in most other types of 
cases, because of the belief that owners are likely to change their 
positions in reliance on these holdings.  All the current members of the 
Court have embraced various formulations of this precept.  In the 2015 
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decision of Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, for example, five 
current Justices―joined by Scalia―endorsed the statement in Justice 
Kagan’s majority opinion that because property rights were entitled to a 
“superpowered form of stare decisis, we would need a superspecial 
justification” to overrule a decision in this area.331  But no “superspecial 
justifications” for reversing any of these decisions can be imagined at 
this point. 
It also seems unlikely that Scalia’s absence will alter the 
fundamental pro-owner orientation of the Roberts Court.  The Court’s 
veneration of property rights is reflected in the unanimous decision of 
McBurney v. Young, which emphasized that “the right to ‘take, hold and 
dispose of property . . .’ has long been seen as one of the privileges of 
citizenship.”332  Consider, for example, the scope of the Takings 
Clause―perhaps the most controversial issue in modern constitutional 
property jurisprudence.  The Roberts Court decided five cases on this 
subject before Scalia’s death: Wilkie, Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
Koontz, Horne, and Arkansas Game & Fish Commission.333  Scalia 
agreed with the outcome of all five decisions, but this only affected the 
result in Koontz.334  In the other four cases, majorities of seven or eight 
Justices agreed on the result―so Scalia’s vote made no difference in the 
outcome.335  As this example suggests, owners will generally continue to 
win in the Roberts Court in civil property-related disputes. 
Beyond this point, predicting the future trajectory of the Court’s 
property jurisprudence is more difficult.  Inevitable changes in the 
composition of the Court, as Scalia and perhaps others are replaced, will 
obviously affect its direction.  But it appears that the four trends analyzed 
above will continue to shape the Court’s property jurisprudence for some 
time to come, if perhaps with less force. 
First, the propertization of the Constitution is likely to continue in 
Scalia’s absence, if at a more gradual pace.  It is important to remember 
that the strong pro-owner orientation of the Roberts Court shows no 
signs of abating.  Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and Justice 
Alito, in particular, have emerged as leaders in the Court’s modern 
property jurisprudence.  Their future opinions will undoubtedly be 
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affected by Scalia’s views, but will also certainly diverge from them in 
meaningful ways.  The most important difference may be that Scalia 
forcefully advocated for groundbreaking expansions of property 
rights―as reflected in his Second and Fourth Amendment decisions and 
his ambitious dicta in Stop the Beach Renourishment―rather than 
incremental advances.  Based on their past opinions, Roberts, Kennedy, 
and Alito, by contrast, will probably focus on more gradual extensions, 
and there is every reason to believe that other Justices will concur in this 
approach. 
The parameters of the Court’s sweeping Second and Fourth 
Amendment decisions will undoubtedly be the subject of extensive 
litigation, requiring it to refine these holdings.  Because Justice Scalia 
was the most passionate supporter of these rulings, his absence from the 
Court will affect the outcome.  It seems likely that the scope of Heller 
and McDonald will be narrowly confined to their facts―essentially 
allowing possession of certain weapons in the home―rather than 
expanded more broadly as Scalia presumably desired.336  And the Jones-
Jardines definition of “constitutionally protected areas” will probably 
need clarification as a plethora of new cases will test its outer limits. 
The Court’s future Takings Clause jurisprudence is more 
problematic.  Based on its first decade, it is reasonable to believe that the 
Roberts Court will continue to expand its scope―but without bold leaps.  
In particular, Stop the Beach Renourishment is a virtual invitation for 
property owners to claim that a judicial taking has occurred, under either 
the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause.  The vague distinction in 
Koontz between a monetary exaction and a tax will require clarification.  
Future cases in both areas will give the Court the opportunity to redefine 
the borders of these doctrines. 
Second, it is likely that future decisions of the Roberts Court will be 
affected by its unusually strong pro-home orientation, which is shared by 
all the current Justices.  Accordingly, it seems probable that the Court 
will continue to enlarge legal protection for the home in constitutional 
doctrine.  For example, the Court might determine that a higher degree of 
“public use” is required before government may condemn a home or 
even revitalize the dormant Third Amendment by extending it to new 
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situations.  It is also conceivable that the Court could employ the 
proverbial “thin end of the wedge” approach, gradually widening pro-
owner doctrines developed in home-protective decisions to encompass 
other forms of property, thereby broadening protection for property 
rights in general.337 
Third, the Roberts Court may continue to weave professed fear of 
government misconduct into the rationales for its future property 
decisions, though this is less certain after Scalia’s death.  All the current 
Justices have either written or joined multiple opinions that express such 
distrust.338  To some extent, this development mirrors public sentiment.  
For example, during the Roberts Court era, the percentage of Americans 
who trust the federal government has significantly declined.339  In this 
atmosphere, it is unsurprising that the Stop the Beach Renourishment 
plurality would proclaim that the federal judiciary was “the branch of 
government whose procedures are, by far, the most protective of 
individual rights.”340  But the Court’s apparent reliance on distrust of 
other branches of government as a substantive rationale for its property 
decisions is troubling. 
Fourth, the Roberts Court will inevitably need to confront the 
definition of “property” in future cases.  The trend toward equating real 
property and personal property seems likely to continue, as evidenced by 
Horne―where six current Justices joined Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion 
that no distinction was appropriate.341  Similarly, five current Justices 
appear to concur that a “right” may be “property” even if it has no 
ascertainable market value; it remains to be seen, however, whether they 
will adhere to this position when the issue is central to the outcome.  
Lastly, the tension between the static property and dynamic property 
theories is likely to remain unresolved for some time.  Although Justice 
Scalia’s absence will weaken support for the static theory, Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas will undoubtedly continue to 
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press the Court to adopt it in the future. 
APPENDIX 
This study examined all Supreme Court decisions that met four 
criteria: (1) the underlying case involved a property-related dispute;342 
(2) the case was argued before the Court during the tenure of Chief 
Justice Roberts;343 (3) the case was decided before Justice Scalia’s 
death;344 and (4) one party to the case was a property owner345 as a 
petitioner or respondent and the opposing party was a government 
entity.346 
A. CIVIL PROPERTY-RELATED DECISIONS BY THE ROBERTS COURT 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418 (2006):  legality  of  possession  and  use  of   hallucinogenic tea 
under Religious Freedom Restoration Act;  owner wins. 
 
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006): adequacy of notice of tax 
sale of home under Due Process Clause; owner wins. 
 
Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 
(2006): validity of lien imposed by state on settlement fund under federal 
Medicaid statutes; owner wins. 
 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006): validity of 
regulations defining wetlands under Clean Water Act which restrict 
owners from building; owners win. 
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Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007): authority of 
Environmental Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gases to 
mitigate coastal flooding; owners (state and private parties representing 
owner side) win. 
 
Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007): validity of 
regulations concerning replacement of electric generators under Clean 
Air Act; owner loses. 
 
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007): validity of ordinances concerning solid 
waste under Interstate Commerce Clause; owner (trade group 
representing owners) loses. 
 
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007): right of 
owner of industrial facility to sue federal government for partial 
reimbursement of CERCLA cleanup costs; owner wins. 
 
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007): liability of government 
employees for allegedly trying to obtain easement from landowner by 
abusive means; owner loses. 
 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): validity of 
District of Columbia ordinances which effectively prohibit possession of 
a handgun in the home under the Second Amendment; owner wins. 
 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 
(2009): liability of landowners to government for CERCLA cleanup 
costs; owners win. 
 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 
U.S. 702 (2010): legality of judicial decision which allegedly takes 
property rights from coastal landowners under Takings Clause; owner 
group loses. 
 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010): validity of city 
ordinances that effectively prohibit possession of a handgun in the home 
under the Second Amendment; owners win. 
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Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011): 
liability of power plant owners for greenhouse gas emissions under 
nuisance law; owners win. 
 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011): validity of law that 
restricts sale and use of pharmacy records; owner side wins. 
 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011): validity of 
statute under First Amendment which restricts sales and other transfers 
of certain video games to minors;  owners win. 
 
Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012): validity of statute 
that bans slaughter of animals; trade group representing owners wins. 
 
Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012): ability of landowners to 
challenge enforcement decision under Clean Water Act; owners win. 
 
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. 
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012): ability of neighboring landowner to 
challenge government decision to allow tribe to take land into trust; 
owner wins. 
 
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012): 
liability of federal government under Takings Clause for downstream 
flooding; owner side wins (state acting in capacity of private owner). 
 
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013): validity of 
maritime lien imposed on floating home; owner wins. 
 
Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013): validity of 
lien imposed by state on settlement fund under federal Medicaid statutes; 
owner wins. 
 
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013): ability of owners to 
challenge decision of federal agency to seize raisins; owners win. 
 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013): 
liability of state agency under Takings Clause for imposing development 
mitigation fee; owners win. 
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Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257 
(2014): entitlement of  government to easement on real property; owner 
wins. 
 
T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808 (2015): legality 
of city’s decision to refuse permit for construction of cell tower; owner 
wins. 
 
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015): liability of 
government under Takings Clause for seizure of raisins; owners win. 
 
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015): legality of 
ordinance under Fourth Amendment which allows police to search hotel 
records; owner side wins (represented by  trade group). 
 
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015): ability of property owners to sue under the Fair 
Housing Act on a disparate-impact theory; owner side wins. 
B. CRIMINAL PROPERTY-RELATED DECISIONS BY THE ROBERTS COURT 
Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006): liability of government agents 
under Bivens for damage to computer equipment taken from owners; 
owners lose. 
 
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner loses. 
 
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner wins. 
 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner loses. 
 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner loses. 
 
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006): right of inmate under First 
Amendment to have access to newspapers, magazines, and photos; 
owner loses. 
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Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007): Fourth 
Amendment decision; owner loses. 
 
Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007): interpretation of 
criminal statute concerning “use” of a firearm; owner wins. 
 
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008): liability of 
prison officials for mishandling inmate’s belongings; owner loses. 
 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner loses. 
 
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner loses. 
 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009): Fourth Amendment decision; 
owner wins. 
 
Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner loses. 
 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010): right of defendant 
under First Amendment to possess photos depicting animal cruelty; 
owner wins. 
 
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011): Fourth Amendment decision; 
owner loses. 
 
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner loses. 
 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owners win. 
 
Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987 (2012): Fourth Amendment decision; 
owners lose. 
 
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012): Fourth 
Amendment decision; owner loses. 
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S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012): liability of 
defendant for storing hazardous waste on its land; owner wins. 
 
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012): legality of statute 
under First Amendment that criminalizes wearing unearned medals; 
owner wins. 
 
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner loses. 
 
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner wins. 
 
Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (2013): Fourth Amendment decision; 
owner loses. 
 
Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014): legality under Sixth 
Amendment of protective order freezing assets of criminal defendants; 
owners lose. 
 
Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner loses. 
 
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owners win. 
 
Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owners lose. 
 
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014): Fourth Amendment 
decision; owner loses. 
 
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015): interpretation of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act regarding whether a fish is a “tangible object”; 
owner wins. 
 
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015): Fourth 
Amendment decision; owner wins. 
 
Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015): interpretation of 
statute criminalizing possession of a firearm by a felon; owner wins. 
 
